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Abstract. We introduce the zero-sum game problem of soft watermark-
ing: The hidden information (watermark) comes from a continuum and
has a perceptual value; the receiver generates an estimate of the embed-
ded watermark to minimize the expected estimation error (unlike the
conventional watermarking schemes where both the hidden information
and the receiver output are from a discrete finite set). Applications in-
clude embedding a multimedia content into another. We consider in this
paper the scalar Gaussian case and use expected mean-squared distor-
tion. We formulate the resulting problem as a zero-sum game between
the encoder & receiver pair and the attacker. We show that for the lin-
ear encoder, the optimal attacker is Gaussian-affine, derive the optimal
system parameters in that case, and discuss the corresponding system
behavior. We also provide numerical results to gain further insight and
understanding of the system behavior at optimality.
1 Introduction
Watermarking (also termed as information or data hiding throughout the pa-
per) refers to altering an input signal to transmit information in a hidden fashion
while preserving the perceptual quality. The watermarked signal is then subject
to an attack which “sabotage”s the receiver. In this paper, we focus on “robust”
watermarking (unlike steganography or fragile watermarking): The decoder aims
to recover the embedded watermark as accurately as possible, even in the pres-
ence of (potentially malicious) attacks as long as they preserve the perceptual
quality.
Robust watermarking has been an active area of research for nearly two
decades, with applications ranging from security-related ones (such as copyright
protection, fingerprinting and traitor tracing) to the ones aiming conventional
tasks related to multimedia management and processing (such as database anno-
tation, in-band captioning, and transaction tracking). Since the underlying task
is to transmit the (hidden) information by means of a watermark, the resulting
scheme falls within the category of information transmission problems and can
be analyzed using techniques from communications and information theory -
see [1] for an overview of data hiding from such a perspective.
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Furthermore, the presence of an intelligent attacker enables a game theoretic
perspective: Encoder, decoder, and attacker can be viewed as players where the
encoder and decoder share a common utility and their gain is exactly the loss of
the attacker, thereby resulting in a zero-sum game. In [2,3], the authors formu-
lated the problem of (robust) information hiding as a game between the encoder
& decoder and the attacker; using an information-theoretic approach, they de-
rived expressions for the maximum rate of reliable information transmission (i.e.,
capacity) for the i.i.d. (independent identically distributed) setup. An analogous
approach has been used to extend these results to colored Gaussian signals in [4].
To the best of our knowledge, so far all of the robust watermarking ap-
proaches have assumed that the information to be transmitted is an element of
a discrete finite (usually binary) set. This is because of the fact that in most
intended applications, the watermark is aimed to represent an identity for us-
age or ownership (or simply permission to use in case of verification problems).
Consequently, the receiver is usually designed to decode the embedded water-
mark (or in case of verification problems detect the presence or absence of a
watermark), resulting in a joint source-channel coding problem, where the chan-
nel coding counterpart refers to the reliable transmission of the watermark and
the source coding counterpart refers to the lossy compression of the unmarked
source. In [2–4], following the conventional joint source-channel coding paradigm
of information theory, an error event is said to occur if the decoded watermark
is not the same as the embedded watermark (hence a hard decision).
In contrast with prior art, in this paper we propose a setup where the in-
formation to be transmitted is from a continuum and there is an associated
perceptual value. As such, the receiver acts as an estimator, whose goal is to pro-
duce an estimate of the hidden information from the same continuum (rather
than a decoder or detector that reaches a hard decision). Applications include
the cases where we hide one multimedia signal inside another (such as embedding
one smaller low-resolution image inside another larger high-resolution image, or
hiding an audio message inside a video, etc). In such cases, the receiver output
is from a continuum as well and there is no hard decision made by it (unlike
the prior art in robust watermarking); hence the receiver provides a solution
to a soft decision problem3,4. Accordingly, we use the term “soft watermark-
ing” to refer to such data hiding problems. Therefore, unlike the prior art where
the fundamental problem is joint source-channel coding, in this case we have
a joint source-source coding problem where the encoder needs to perform lossy
compression on both the unmarked source and the data to be hidden.
3 This distinction is reminiscent of the differentiation between hard and soft decoding
methods in classical communication theory.
4 One alternative approach for this problem may involve using a separated setup,
where we first apply lossy compression to the information to be hidden that possesses
perceptual value, and subsequently embed the compression output into the unmarked
host using a conventional capacity-achieving data hiding code. It is not immediately
clear which approach is superior; a comparative assessment constitutes part of our
future research.
As a first step toward our long-term goal of studying the soft watermarking
problem in its full generality, we consider here a simpler version of the broad
soft watermarking problem to gain insight: we confine ourselves to the scalar-
Gaussian case where we use expected squared error as the distortion metric. In
the future, our aim is to address the asymptotically high dimensional vector
case (i.e., information-theoretic setting) with a general class of distributions
associated with arbitrary distortion metrics.
In Sec. 2, we introduce the notation and provide the problem formulation.
In Sec. 3, we present the main results: In Sec. 3.1, we show that Gaussian-affine
attack mapping is optimal for the class of linear encoders; in Sec. 3.2, we derive
optimal system parameters for such encoder and attacker classes; in Sec. 3.3,
we discuss the system properties at optimality, provide bounds and analyze
asymptotic behavior. We present numerical results in Sec. 4 and concluding
remarks in Sec. 5.
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Fig. 1. The problem setting.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Let R and R+ denote the respective sets of real numbers and positive real num-
bers. Let E(·) denote the expectation operator.
The Gaussian density with mean µ and variance σ2 is denoted as N (µ, σ2).
All logarithms in the paper are natural logarithms and may in general be complex
valued, and the integrals are, in general, Lebesgue integrals.
2.2 Problem Definition
A generic model of the problem is presented in Fig. 1. We consider independent
scalar Gaussian random variables X ∼ N (0, σ2x) and S ∼ N (0, σ2s) to denote
the watermark (the data to be hidden) and the signal, respectively.
A deterministic mapping of X and S is transmitted over the channel gener-
ated by the encoder5. Let the transmitter strategy be denoted by g(·, ·), which is
an element of the space ΓT , of real-valued Borel measurable functions satisfying
the constraint:
E
{
( g(X,S)− S)2} ≤ PE . (1)
We note that this is a classical constraint that limits the distortion incurred by
the watermark embedding process.
The attacker (also termed as the jammer) has access to the output of the
transmitter, U = g(X,S), and outputs a random transformation of U , denoted
by Y , i.e., assigns a probability measure, µ, on the output Y that satisfies
∞∫
−∞
E
{
(Y − U)2|Y } dµ(Y ) ≤ PA (2)
We denote the class of all associated probability measures µ for the jammer by
M. We note that the constraint (2) corresponds to the classical distortion con-
straint on the attacker used in the watermarking literature (see e.g., [2, Equation
13], [3, Equation 2.2]): It aims to guarantee that the attacker does not distort
the watermarked signal beyond a perceptually acceptable level. Thus, in our
framework, the attacker has two (possibly conflicting) objectives: i) maximize
the distortion between the watermark and its generated estimate by the decoder
(cf. (3)), and ii) maintain the usability of the attack output from a perceptual
point of view (captured by (2)).
Note that, the constraint (2) differs from the traditional power constraint in
classical communication (jamming) games, where the constraint on the attacker
arises due to the physical limitations on the communication channel and can be
formulated as a power constraint on the attack output Y (i.e., an upper bound on
E
(
Y 2
)
) [6]. Since such physical limitations do not exist in our current problem
formulation, such a constraint is not immediately applicable to our setup6. Also
note that, in assessing the perceptual quality of Y , as a first step and following
[2,3], we take U as the benchmark for the attacker to compare. Alternatively, it is
plausible to use S as the benchmark (see e.g., “type-S” constraint in [4, Equation
2.3]), which implies imposing an upper bound on E (S − Y )2 and constitutes part
of our future research as well.
We consider the power constraints (1,2) in the expectation form, mainly for
tractability purposes. Constraints for each realization (in almost sure sense) were
also used in the literature [2], but are beyond the scope of our treatment here.
The receiver applies a Borel-measurable transformation h(Y ) on its input Y ,
so as to produce an estimate Xˆ of X, by minimizing the squared error distortion
5 In classical (information-theoretic) watermarking literature, a pseudo-random key
sequence is shared between the encoder and the decoder, mainly to render the at-
tacker strategies memoryless. In this paper, we do not consider the key sequence in
the problem formulation since our formulation is based on single-letter strategies.
6 The investigation of a potential relationship between (2) and imposing an upper
bound on E
(
Y 2
)
for the data hiding setup constitutes part of our future research.
measure
J (g, h, µ) =
∞∫
−∞
E
{
(h(Y )−X)2|Y } dµ(Y ) (3)
We denote the class of all Borel-measurable mappings h (·) to be used as the
receiver mapping by ΓR. Joint statistics of X and S, and all objectives are
common knowledge.
The common objective of the transmitter and the receiver is to minimize J
by properly choosing g ∈ ΓT and h ∈ ΓR, while the objective of the attacker is
to maximize J over the choice of µ ∈ M. Since there is a complete conflict of
interest, this problem constitutes a zero-sum game.
However, this game does not have a value, since the lower value of the game
J¯ = sup
µ∈M
inf
g∈ΓT
h∈ΓR
J(g, h, µ)
is not well defined. This is because the attacker cannot guarantee that (2) is
satisfied without knowing the encoder strategy g since the value of the left hand
side of (2) depends on the joint distribution of U and Y which is impacted by
g7. Hence our main focus is on the following minimax optimization problem
which corresponds to the upper value of the game (which in fact safeguards
the transmitter-receiver pair against worst attacks and is more relevant for the
problem at hand)
J∗ = inf
g∈ΓT
h∈ΓR
sup
µ∈M
J(g, h, µ). (4)
Note that, the aforementioned formulation implies that the encoder mapping g (·)
is known by the attacker. Note also that for each g ∈ ΓT , we have a zero-sum
game between the attacker and the receiver. This subgame has a well-defined
value8, and hence, inf and sup operators can be interchanged, and further they
can be replaced by min and max, respectively, i.e., (4) is equivalent to
J∗ = inf
g∈ΓT
max
µ∈M
min
h∈ΓR
J(g, h, µ), (5)
which we consider throughout the rest of the paper. In other words, there is
no loss for the encoder-decoder team to determine and announce the decoder
7 One way to get around this problem is to introduce soft constraints into the objective
of the attacker. Then, the problem is no longer a zero-sum game. Another way is to
define the attacker constraint for each realization, in almost sure sense, in which case
the attacker can satisfy its constraint for any encoding strategy. These are beyond
the scope of this paper.
8 This is a zero-sum game where the objective is linear (hence, concave) in the at-
tacker mapping for a fixed decoder map, and the optimal decoder mapping is unique
(conditional mean) for a given attacker mapping.M is weak*-compact, and the min-
imizing h can be restricted to a compact subset of ΓR (with (3) bounded away from
zero); hence a saddle point exists due to the standard min-max theorem of game
theory in infinite-dimensional spaces [7].
mapping before the attacker picks its own mapping, or there is no gain for the
decoder to know the attacker mapping a priori.
3 Main Results
Given Y , the encoder mapping g (·), and the attacker mapping µ (·), the decoder’s
goal is to calculate the estimate Xˆ (Y ) of X so as to minimize the expected
squared error distortion measure (cf. (3)) J = E
[
X − Xˆ (Y )
]2
. The minimizer
here is the well-known MMSE (minimum mean squared error) estimate of X
given Y : XˆMMSE (Y ) = E (X|Y ). Then, the resulting problem is
inf
g
max
µ
J = E
[
X − XˆMMSE (Y )
]2
(6)
subject to the constraints (1,2). In Sec. 3.1, we show that, in the sense of (6),
the optimal functional form of µ is a “jointly-Gaussian-affine mapping” provided
that the functional form of the encoder is linear. Using this result, in Sec. 3.2
we solve the problem (6) within the class of linear encoder mappings subject to
(1,2)9 and characterize the parameters of the corresponding system. In Sec. 3.3,
we provide a detailed discussion on the optimality results presented in Sec. 3.2.
3.1 On Optimal Functional Forms of the Encoder and Attacker
We first focus on a special case as an auxiliary step, where the encoder mapping
is the identity operator, g (X,S) = X, together with a “generalized” version
of the constraint (2), where an upper bound is imposed on E (Y − aU)2 for an
arbitrary a ∈ R. We present the corresponding optimality result of this special
case in Lemma 1. We then use Lemma 1 as an auxiliary step to reach the main
result of this section, which states that the Gaussian-affine attack mapping is
optimal for the class of linear encoders under the constraint (2); this is reported
in Lemma 2.
Lemma 1. Given the encoder strategy of U = g (X,S) = X, the solution to
max
µ
E
[
X − XˆMMSE (Y )
]2
(7)
subject to an upper bound on E (Y − aU)2 for some a ∈ R is of the form Y =
κU + Z where Z ∼ N (0, σ2z) is independent of U .
Proof. Define C (mXY ,mY Y ) 4=
{
µ
∣∣Eµ (XY ) = mXY ,Eµ (Y 2) = mY Y }, where
Eµ (·) denotes expectation with respect to the joint distribution of X and Y ,
induced by the attack mapping µ (·). Next, define Xˆ ′ (Y ) 4= E(XY )E(Y 2) Y . Thus, by
9 As such, the result provided in Sec. 3.2 forms an upper bound on the solution of (6);
see Remark 1 in Sec. 3.3 for a further discussion.
definition, Xˆ ′ (Y ) := Xˆ ′C (Y ) is the same for all µ ∈ C (mXY ,mY Y ) given a pair
(mXY ,mY Y ). This further implies that, for any given µ ∈ C (mXY ,mY Y ),
E
[
X − XˆMMSE,µ (Y )
]2
≤ E
[
X − Xˆ ′C (Y )
]2
(8)
by the definition of the MMSE estimate. The upper bound of (8) is achieved when
X and Y are jointly Gaussian, in which case XˆMMSE = XˆLMMSE = Xˆ
′
C , which
is a well-known result. Thus, we conclude that among all the attack strategies
which yield the same E (XY ) and E
(
Y 2
)
, the one (if exists) that renders X and
Y jointly Gaussian achieves the maximum cost, thereby being the optimal choice
for the attacker. A similar reasoning was used in Lemma 1 of [8] for a zero-delay
jamming problem.
Next, note that, for any given µ ∈ C (mXY ,mY Y ) and σ2x = E
(
X2
)
, we have
Eµ [Y − aU ]2 = Eµ [Y − aX]2 = mY Y − 2amXY + σ2x,
implying that all elements of C (mXY ,mY Y ) yield the same E (Y − aU)2.
Let µ∗ be a solution to (7) subject to an upper bound on E (Y − aU)2.
Assuming existence, let µ′ be an element of C (Eµ∗ (XY ) ,Eµ∗ (Y 2)) that ren-
ders X and Y jointly Gaussian. Due to the aforementioned arguments, we have
E
[
X − XˆMMSE,µ∗ (Y )
]2
= E
[
X − XˆMMSE,µ′ (Y )
]2
= E
[
X − Xˆ ′C (Y )
]2
and
that Eµ∗ [Y − aU ]2 = Eµ′ [Y − aU ]2. Hence, if µ′ exists, it is optimal.
Existence: Consider the mapping Y = κU + Z = κX + Z for some κ and
Z ∼ N (0, σ2z) independent of X. Then, straightforward algebra reveals that κ =
E (XY ) /σ2x and σ2z = E
(
Y 2
)−[E (XY )]2 /σ2x. Hence, given σ2x, there is a one-to-
one mapping between the pairs of
(
E (XY ) ,E
(
Y 2
))
and
(
κ, σ2z
)
. Consequently,
for any given
(
E (XY ) ,E
(
Y 2
))
, we can find
(
κ, σ2z
)
that guarantees the existence
of µ′ that renders X and Y jointly Gaussian. This completes the proof. uunionsq
Lemma 2. Given the linear encoder strategy of U = g (X,S) = αX + βS for
some α, β ∈ R, the solution to
max
µ
E
[
X − XˆMMSE (Y )
]2
, (9)
subject to E (Y − U)2 ≤ PA, is of the form Y = κU + Z, where Z ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
is independent of U .
Proof. Let T denote the MMSE estimate of X given U : T
4
= XˆMMSE (U). First,
note that for any attack mapping µ and for any function p (·), (X − T ) is or-
thogonal to p (Y ):
E [(X − T (U)) p (Y )] = EU
{
E
[
Xp (Y )
∣∣U]− E [T (U) p (Y ) ∣∣U]}
= EU
{
E
[
X
∣∣U]E [p (Y ) ∣∣U]− T (U)E [p (Y ) ∣∣U]}(10)
= 0, (11)
where (10) follows from the fact that X ↔ U ↔ Y forms a Markov chain in
the specified order, and (11) follows from recalling that E
[
X
∣∣U] = T (U) by
definition. This implies
J = E
[
X − XˆMMSE (Y )
]2
= E
[
X − T (U) + T (U)− XˆMMSE (Y )
]2
= E [X − T (U)]2 + E
[
T (U)− XˆMMSE (Y )
]2
, (12)
where (12) follows from the fact that the estimation error (X − T ) is orthogonal
to any function of U and Y (cf. (11)). Since E [X − T (U)]2 is invariant in µ,
maximizing J over µ is equivalent to maximizing E
[
T (U)− XˆMMSE (Y )
]2
over
µ. Furthermore, since U is linear in X and they are jointly Gaussian, MMSE
coincides with LMMSE, implying that θT (U) = U for some θ ∈ R. Therefore,
(9) is equivalent to
max
µ
E
[
T − XˆMMSE (Y )
]2
, (13)
subject to E (Y − θT )2 ≤ PA. By Lemma 1, we know the solution to (13): At
optimality, Y = κ′T + Z where Z ∼ N (0, σ2z) is independent of T . But since
T is linear in U , this is equivalent to the statement of the lemma. Hence the
proof. uunionsq
3.2 Characterization of Optimal System Parameters
Motivated by Lemma 2, throughout the rest of the paper we confine ourselves
to the class of linear mappings for the encoder (14) and jointly-Gaussian-affine
mappings for the attacker (15):
U = g (X,S) = αX + βS, (14)
Y = κU + Z, (15)
where X ∼ N (0, σ2x), S ∼ N (0, σ2s), Z ∼ N (0, σ2z) are all independent of each
other. The decoder generates the (L)MMSE estimate of X given Y :
XˆLMMSE (Y ) = XˆMMSE (Y ) = E (X |Y ) = E (XY )E (Y 2) Y, (16)
with the corresponding mean-squared error cost function
J := J (g, h, µ) = E
[
X − XˆLMMSE (Y )
]2
= E
(
X2
)−[E (XY )]2 /E (Y 2) . (17)
Using (14,15,17) in (1,2,5), the resulting equivalent problem to (5) is given by
minα,β∈R maxκ∈R,σ2z∈R+ J (18)
s.t. E (U − S)2 ≤ PE , (19)
E (Y − U)2 ≤ PA, (20)
where we have replaced “inf” with “min”, since g is restricted to linear maps and
the cost function is bounded from below by zero (thus restricting g to a compact
set without any loss of generality). Note that, the parameters α, β (resp. the
parameters κ, σ2z) constitute the degrees of freedom for the encoder (resp, the
attacker) given its linear (resp. affine) nature. Also, (19) (resp. (20)) represents
the power constraint for the encoder (resp. the attacker), equivalent to (1) (resp.
(2)) to ensure the perceptual fidelity of the marked signal U (resp. the attacked
signal Y ) under the aforementioned parametrization. In Theorem 1, we provide
the solution to the minimax problem (18) under the constraints (19,20). Our
results are given using the parametrization via σ2u
4
= E
(
U2
)
. A summary of the
results of Theorem 1 is given in Table 1.
Theorem 1. The solution to the minimax soft watermarking problem (18) sub-
ject to the constraints (19,20) is as follows:
(a) For PA ≤
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
, at optimality σ2u is the unique positive root of the
depressed cubic polynomial
f
(
σ2u
) 4
= σ6u − σ2u
[(
σ2s − PE
)2
+ 2PA
(
σ2s + PE
)]
+ 2PA
(
σ2s − PE
)2
, (21)
in the interval of
[
max
(
PA,
(
σs −
√
PE
)2)
,
(
σs +
√
PE
)2]
. The corresponding
optimal values of the system parameters are
β =
1
2
σ2u + σ
2
s − PE
σ2s
, (22)
α =
√√√√[(σs +√PE)2 − σ2u] [σ2u − (σs −√PE)2]
4σ2sσ
2
x
, (23)
κ = 1− PA
σ2u
, (24)
σ2z = PAκ. (25)
leading the corresponding optimal value of the cost function as
J = σ2x −
σ4xα
2
(
σ2u − PA
)
σ4u
(26)
(b) If PA >
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
, then at optimality we have κ = 0, σ2z ∈
[
0, PA − σ2u
]
is arbitrary, where
σ2u = α
2σ2x + β
2σ2s < PA
for any α, β ∈ R such that α2σ2x + (β − 1)2 σ2s ≤ PE. In that case, the corre-
sponding value of the cost function is given by J = σ2x.
Proof. We first characterize the cost function J (cf. (17)) and the power con-
straints (19,20) under the given parameterization. Given (14,15) and the inde-
pendence of X, S, Z, we have
E (XY ) = κE (XU) = κασ2x, (27)
E
(
Y 2
)
= E (κU + Z)2 = κ2σ2u + σ2z . (28)
Using (27,28) in (17), we get
J = σ2x − σ4x
κ2α2
κ2σ2u + σ
2
z
. (29)
Furthermore, using (14,15), we can rewrite (19,20) as
E (U − S)2 = E [αX + (β − 1)S]2 = α2σ2x + (β − 1)2 σ2s ≤ PE , (30)
E (Y − U)2 = E [(κ− 1)U + Z]2 = (κ− 1)2 σ2u + σ2z ≤ PA, (31)
where
σ2u = E (U)
2
= E [αX + βS]2 = α2σ2x + β2σ2s . (32)
Step 1 (Inner Optimization): For any given fixed α, β, we focus on the innermost
maximization problem of (18) subject to the constraint (31). Using (29), we
observe that an equivalent problem is
min
κ∈R,σ2z∈R+
JA, (33)
subject to (31), where J = σ2x − σ4xJA, and
JA
4
=
κ2α2
κ2σ2u + σ
2
z
. (34)
First, consider the special case of κ = 0: In that case, the attacker erases
all the information about the original signal and the watermark and we would
have JA = 0. Since JA is lower-bounded by zero by definition, this would be the
optimal policy for the attacker as long as (31) can be satisfied for κ = 0. In that
case, we have E (Y − U)2 ∣∣
κ=0
= σ2u +σ
2
z per (31). Since the attacker can choose
σ2z arbitrarily small but cannot alter σ
2
u, we arrive at
if α, β ∈ R are such that PA ≥ σ2u, then
κopt = 0, σ
2
z,opt ∈
[
0, PA − σ2u
]
is arbitrary, and JA,opt = 0, Jopt = σ
2
x. (35)
Thus, for the rest of the proof, we consider PA < σ
2
u and κ 6= 0. In that case, we
can rewrite JA =
α2
σ2u+σ
2
z/κ
2 , and an equivalent problem to (33) is
max
κ∈R\{0},σ2z∈R+
J ′A, (36)
subject to (31) where JA =
α2
σ2u+J
′
A
and J ′A
4
= σ2z/κ
2. Next, note that, for all
κ ∈ R\{0}, J ′A and left hand side of (31) are both monotonic increasing in σ2z .
Thus, the constraint (31) is active at optimality, which yields
σ2z = PA − (κ− 1)2 σ2u. (37)
Using (37) and the re-parametrization of t
4
= 1/κ in the definition of J ′A, we get
J ′A =
σ2z
κ2
=
PA − (κ− 1)2 σ2u
κ2
= PAt
2 − (t− 1)2 σ2u =
(
PA − σ2u
)
t2 + 2σ2ut− σ2u.
(38)
Since PA < σ
2
u, J
′
A is concave in t. Hence, maximization of (38) subject to (37)
admits a unique solution, given by
topt = − σ
2
u
PA − σ2u
⇔ κopt = σ
2
u − PA
σ2u
, (39)
which is equivalent to (24). Using this result in (37) yields
σ2z,opt = PA − (κopt − 1)2 σ2u = PA −
P 2A
σ2u
, (40)
which is equivalent to (25). Note that, σ2u > PA implies the positivity of κopt
and σ2z,opt per (39) and (40), respectively. Using (39,40) in the cost function
definitions, we get
J ′A,opt
4
= J ′A
∣∣
κ=κopt,σ2z=σ
2
z,opt
=
σ2z,opt
κ2opt
=
PA
κopt
=
PAσ
2
u
σ2u − PA
, (41)
JE
4
= JA,opt = JA
∣∣
κ=κopt,σ2z=σ
2
z,opt
=
α2
σ2u + J
′
A,opt
=
α2
(
σ2u − PA
)
σ4u
, (42)
J = σ2x − σ4xJE . (43)
Note that (26) directly follows from using (42) in (43).
Step 2 (Outer Optimization): Next, given the solution to the inner optimiza-
tion problem of (18) in (42), we proceed with solving the corresponding outer
optimization problem, given by
max
α,β∈R
JE , (44)
subject to the constraint (30) and σ2u > PA.
First, we show that, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) we can assume α, β ≥
0. Define the left hand side of (30) as a bivariate function of (α, β):
q (α, β)
4
= α2σ2x + (β − 1)2 σ2s . (45)
Note that both JE and q are even functions of α. So, w.l.o.g. we can assume
α ≥ 0. Furthermore, for any β < 0, we have (β − 1)2 = (|β| − 1)2 + 2|β|. Hence,
for any α ∈ R and β < 0, we have q (α, β) = q (α, |β|)+2|β|σ2s . This implies that
for any β < 0, [q (α, β) ≤ PE ] ⇒ [q (α, |β|) ≤ PE ]. Combining this observation
with the fact that JE is an even function of β, we reach the conclusion that
w.l.o.g. we can assume β ≥ 0.
Next, we show that for σ2u > PA, the constraint (30) is active at optimality.
In order to do that, we examine the behavior of both JE and q with respect
to α2 (noting that there is a one-to-one mapping between α and α2 since we
assume α ≥ 0 w.l.o.g.). We have
∂q
∂α2
= σ2x > 0, (46)
∂JE
∂α2
=
σ2u − PA
σ4u
+ α2
∂σ2u
∂α2
σ4u − 2σ2u
(
σ2u − PA
)
σ8u
,
=
σ2u − PA
σ4u
+ α2σ2x
−σ2u + 2PA
σ6u
,
=
1
σ6u
[(
σ2u − PA
)
σ2u − α2σ2x
(
σ2u − PA
)
+ α2σ2xPA
]
=
1
σ6u
[(
σ2u − PA
)
β2σ2s + α
2σ2xPA
]
> 0, (47)
where (47) follows from using (32) and recalling that σ2u > PA by assumption.
Now, the monotonicity results (46,47) jointly imply that, at optimality the en-
coder will choose α as large as possible for any fixed β provided that the power
constraint (30) is satisfied. Therefore, the constraint (30) is active at optimality.
Using the fact that the constraint is active at optimality, we have
PE = E (U − S)2 = q (α, β) = α2σ2x + β2σ2s + (1− 2β)σ2s ,
= σ2u + (1− 2β)σ2s , (48)
where (48) follows from (32). Using (48), we get (22).
Our next goal is to rewrite JE (cf. (42)) as a function of σ
2
u, and accordingly
formulate the problem (44) as a univariate maximization problem in terms of
σ2u. Using (22) in (32), we obtain
σ2u = α
2σ2x +
1
4
(
σ2u + σ
2
s − PE
σ2s
)2
σ2s = α
2σ2x +
(
σ2u + σ
2
s − PE
)2
4σ2s
. (49)
Using (49), we get
α2 =
4σ2sσ
2
u −
(
σ2u + σ
2
s − PE
)2
4σ2sσ
2
x
= −
(
σ2u + σ
2
s − PE − 2σsσu
) (
σ2u + σ
2
s − PE + 2σsσu
)
4σ2sσ
2
x
,
= −
[
(σu − σs)2 − PE
] [
(σu + σs)
2 − PE
]
4σ2sσ
2
x
, (50)
= − 1
4σ2sσ
2
x
[(
σu − σs −
√
PE
)
·
(
σu − σs +
√
PE
)
·(
σu + σs −
√
PE
)
·
(
σu + σs +
√
PE
)]
= − 1
4σ2sσ
2
x
[
σ2u −
(
σs +
√
PE
)2] [
σ2u −
(
σs −
√
PE
)2]
, (51)
=
− [σ2u − (σ2s + PE)]2 + 4PEσ2s
4σ2sσ
2
x
. (52)
Using (51), we get (23). Also, the analysis of the constraint α2 ≥ 0 yields[
α2 ≥ 0]⇔ [(σs −√PE)2 ≤ σ2u ≤ (σs +√PE)2] , (53)
which directly follows from (51). Moreover, (53) and the constraint
(
σ2u > PA
)
jointly imply that, if PA >
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
, the feasible set for the problem (44)
is empty. In that case, the encoder cannot generate a powerful enough marked
signal U such that σ2u > PA. Then, at optimality the attacker chooses κ = 0
and erases U (i.e., (35) is valid). As a result, if PA >
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
(which is
equivalent to
√
PA −
√
PE > σs), Theorem 1(b) holds.
On the other hand, if[
PA <
(
σs +
√
PE
)2]
⇔
[√
PA −
√
PE < σs
]
, (54)
the problem (44) reduces to
maxσ2u JE
(
σ2u
)
(55)
s.t. max
[
PA,
(
σs −
√
PE
)2] ≤ σ2u ≤ (σs +√PE)2 , (56)
where
JE
(
σ2u
)
= −
{[
σ2u −
(
σ2s + PE
)]2 − 4PEσ2s}(σ2u − PA)
4σ2sσ
2
xσ
4
u
, (57)
which follows from using (52) in (42).
Next we quantify asymptotic behavior of JE which will be useful in charac-
terizing properties of its extrema. We proceed by first defining the numerator of
JE as N
(
σ2u
)
:
N
(
σ2u
) 4
= −
{[
σ2u −
(
σ2s + PE
)]2 − 4PEσ2s}(σ2u − PA) ,
which, after some straightforward algebraic manipulations, leads to
∂N
∂σ2u
= − [σ2u − (σ2s + PE)] [3σ2u − (σ2s + PE + 2PA)]+ 4σ2sPE ,
∂2N
∂ (σ2u)
2 = −6σ2u + 4
(
σ2s + PE
)
+ 2PA. (58)
Thus, we have
lim
σ2u→0
JE
(
σ2u
)
= lim
σ2u→0
(
σ2s − PE
)2
PA
4σ2sσ
2
xσ
4
u
→ ∞, (59)
lim
σ2u→∞
JE
(
σ2u
)
= lim
σ2u→∞
∂2N/∂
(
σ2u
)2
8σ2sσ
2
x
→ −∞, (60)
lim
σ2u→−∞
JE
(
σ2u
)
= lim
σ2u→−∞
∂2N/∂
(
σ2u
)2
8σ2sσ
2
x
→ ∞, (61)
where (59) follows from (57), and (60,61) follow from using (58).
Next note that, JE
(
σ2u
)
has 3 roots: PA,
(
σs −
√
PE
)2
,
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
. The
first one is obvious with a direct inspection of (57); the second and third roots
directly follow from noting the equality of (51) and (52), and using that in (57).
Assuming that the feasible set for the problem (44) is non-empty, i.e., (54)
holds, (54,59,60,61) jointly imply{
0 < σ2u < min
[
PA,
(
σs −
√
PE
)2]}⇒ JE (σ2u) > 0,{
min
[
PA,
(
σs −
√
PE
)2]
< σ2u < max
[
PA,
(
σs −
√
PE
)2]}⇒ JE (σ2u) < 0,{
max
[
PA,
(
σs −
√
PE
)2]
< σ2u <
(
σs +
√
PE
)2}⇒ JE (σ2u) > 0, (62){(
σs +
√
PE
)2
< σ2u
}
⇒ JE
(
σ2u
)
< 0.
Thus, there are a total of 3 extrema of JE (·). The one that is of interest to us,
i.e., the one which satisfies (56), is a maximizer by (62). Furthermore, there is
a unique such stationary point within the feasible region of (56). In order to
calculate this maximizer, we take the derivative of (57) with respect to σ2u. After
some straightforward algebra we get
(−4σ2sσ2xσ4u) dJEdσ2u = f (σ2u), where f (·) is
a depressed cubic polynomial and is given by (21). The solution of (55) is then
given by the unique positive root of (21) which falls in the region specified by
(56). Recall that this is the solution if (54) are satisfied. This completes the proof
of part (a) of Theorem 1. uunionsq
3.3 Discussion on the System Behavior at Optimality
Remark 1 (On Optimality of Theorem 1) Per Lemma 2, the results reported
in Theorem 1 describe the optimal system characterization when the encoder is
confined to the class of linear mappings (cf. (14)). Hence, in the sense of (17),
our results form an upper bound on the optimal system performance within an
arbitrary class of encoder mappings. Investigation of the tightness of this bound
constitutes part of our future research. Throughout the rest of the paper, when
we refer to optimality, we mean optimality in the sense of Theorem 1.
Remark 2 (Trivial and Non-trivial Policies)
(a) We say that “the (optimal) system is trivial” if, at optimality, the attacker
erases all the information on the mark-embedded signal U and only retains infor-
mation on the additive noise Z. This coincides with having Y = Z (i.e., κ = 0).
Conversely, we have a “non-trivial system” if the attacked signal Y contains in-
formation on the marked signal U (i.e., κ > 0) at optimality.
(b) The case of non-trivial system happens if we have σ2u > PA at optimality
(due to the arguments leading to (35)). This is possible if and only if PA ≤(
σs +
√
PE
)2
(or equivalently
√
PA −
√
PE ≤ σs) (cf. (54)). In this case, given
σ2s and PE , the encoder is able to design α and β such that the power of the
Condition Operation Encoder Attacker
Regime and Cost Parameters Parameters[
PA ≤
(
σs +
√
PE
)2]
Non-Trivial σ2u unique root of f
(
σ2u
)
(21)
⇐⇒ Theorem 1(a) s.t. max
(
PA,
(
σs −
√
PE
)2)
κ = 1− PA/σ2u,[√
PA −
√
PE ≤ σs
]
J = σ2x − σ
4
xα
2(σ2u−PA)
σ4u
≤ σ2u ≤
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
, σ2z = PAκ .
α given by (23),
β = 1
2
(
1 +
σ2u−PE
σ2s
)
.[
PA >
(
σs +
√
PE
)2]
Trivial Any α, β ∈ R s.t. κ = 0,
⇐⇒ Theorem 1(b) α2σ2x + (β − 1)2 σ2s ≤ PE , σ2z ∈
[
PA − σ2u
]
.[√
PA −
√
PE > σs
]
J = σ2x σ
2
u = α
2σ2x + β
2σ2s < PA.
Table 1. Summary of Theorem 1: Characterization of the scalar-Gaussian soft water-
marking system at optimality. The first (leftmost) column indicates the condition that
leads to the operation regime specified in the second column (see Remark 2 of Sec. 3.3
for the description and a discussion on “trivial” and “non-trivial” policies); the third
and fourth columns show the corresponding values of the encoder and attacker param-
eters at optimality, respectively. Note that, in case of Theorem 1(b), while there are
infinitely many choices of encoder parameters, the choice of α = 0, β = 1 +
√
PE/σ2s
is a sensible one and maintains continuity between regions (see Remark 3 of Sec. 3.3
for details).
marked signal U is larger than the power constraint PA and is able to transmit
information about X through the channel. This case is covered in part (a) of The-
orem 1. Conversely, if PA >
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
(or equivalently
√
PA −
√
PE > σs),
we have the case of trivial system, and it is impossible for the encoder to design
U to exceed PA. Then, the optimal attacker can affored to erase U , thus essen-
tially sending noise to the decoder. This case is covered in part (b) of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. (Power Constraints) In the non-trivial regime (Theorem 1(a)),
the encoder power constraint (19) and the attacker power constraint (20) are both
active.
Corollary 2. (Cost Ordering) At optimality, the cost of the non-trivial regime
is upper-bounded by the cost of the trivial regime, σ2x.
Corollary 3. (Existence and Uniqueness) In the non-trivial regime, the
optimal system parameters specified in Theorem 1(a) are guaranteed to exist and
they are essentially unique.10
10 In the proof of Theorem 1, all expressions that involve α are, in fact, functions of α2;
therefore if α∗ is optimal, so is −α∗. To account for such multiple trivial solutions,
we use the term ”essential uniqueness”.
Corollaries 1, 2, 3 directly follow from the proof Theorem 1. Specifically,
Corollary 1 is a consequence of arguments following (36,47), Corollary 2 follows
from using PA ≤ σ2u in (26), and Corollary 3 is because of (62) and the argu-
ments following it.
Remark 3 (On Optimal Encoding Parameters in case of the Triv-
ial System) In case of a trivial system, by Theorem 1(b), there are infinitely
many combinations of system parameters that achieve optimality. Among those,
one choice for the encoder that is intuitively meaningful is to choose α = 0
and β = 1 +
√
PE/σ2s . This choice corresponds to having U = βS such that
E (U − S)2 = (β − 1)2 σ2s = PE , i.e., the encoder chooses not to send any in-
formation on the watermark X and chooses the scaling factor β such that the
power constraint (19) is satisfied with equality. Note that, such a choice ensures
continuity between the values of the system parameters at optimality across
non-trivial and trivial regions (cf. Remark 4).
Remark 4 (On Optimal Operation Regimes)
(a) Variation with respect to system inputs: For PE ≥ PA, the system always
operates at the non-trivial mode at optimality since
√
PA −
√
PE ≤ 0 ≤ σs. For
fixed σ2s and PE , as PA increases, the strength of the attack channel increases
and the attacker is able to act with a better “budget”. As PA increases, when
we reach PA =
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
+  for an arbitrarily small  > 0, the feasible
region for the encoder becomes the empty set (cf. (56)) and a transition from
the non-trivial mode to the trivial mode occurs. Conversely, for fixed PA and for
fixed PE (resp. σ
2
s), as σ
2
s (resp. PE) increases, we observe a transition from the
non-trivial region to the trivial region.
(b) Continuity between the regions: Suppose we have a system that is initially
in the non-trivial region with PA <
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
. Then, we have
lim
PA↑(σs+
√
PE)
2
σ2u = PA =
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
, (63)
lim
PA↑(σs+
√
PE)
2
β =
1
2
σ2s − PE +
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
σ2s
= 1 +
√
PE
σ2s
, (64)
lim
PA↑(σs+
√
PE)
2
α = 0, (65)
lim
PA↑(σs+
√
PE)
2
κ = lim
PA↑(σs+
√
PE)
2
σ2z = 0, (66)
lim
PA↑(σs+
√
PE)
2
J = σ2x, (67)
where (63) follows from noting that the feasible region (56) converges to the
singleton PA =
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
, (64,65) follow from using σ2u =
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
in
(22,23), respectively, and (66,67) follow from using σ2u = PA in (24,25,26), re-
spectively. Note that, the attack parameters (66) and the optimal cost value
(67) readily satisfy continuity with their unique counterparts of Theorem 1(b).
Furthermore, it can be shown that the encoder parameters (64,65) achieve opti-
mality in the trivial regime (cf. Remark 3).
Remark 5 (Performance Bounds)
We focus here on deriving bounds on the cost for the more interesting case of
Theorem 1(a) when
(√
PA −
√
PE
)
< σs. Note that (26), and problem construc-
tion clearly imply the bounds of 0 ≤ J ≤ σ2x. The upper bound is tight and
can be attained for PA =
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
. In order to obtain a potentially tighter
lower bound, we initially proceed with deriving an upper bound on α. Consider
the polynomial
g
(
σ2u
) 4
=
[(
σs +
√
PE
)2
− σ2u
] [
σ2u −
(
σs −
√
PE
)2]
.
Then, it is straightforward to show that g (·) is concave and that
∂g
σ2u
= −2σ2u +
(
σs −
√
PE
)2
+
(
σs +
√
PE
)2
= −2σ2u + 2
(
σ2s + PE
)
.
Hence g (·) is maximized for σ2u = σ2s + PE . Using this result in (23) yields the
following upper bound on α:
α ≤
√√√√g (σ2u) ∣∣∣σ2u=σ2s+PE
4σ2sσ
2
x
=
√
PE
σ2x
. (68)
Furthermore, using (68) on (26), we get
J ≥ σ2x
[
1− PE σ
2
u − PA
σ4u
]
. (69)
Define h
(
σ2u
) 4
=
σ2u−PA
σ4u
. It is straightforward to show that for σ2u ≥ PA, h (·) is
concave and the maximizer is 2PA, which yields h
(
σ2u
) ≤ 14PA . Using this result
in (69) and combining it with the previously mentioned bounds, we get
max
(
0, σ2x
(
1− PE
4PA
))
≤ J ≤ σ2x. (70)
We thus have a non-trivial lower bound for J if PA > PE/4.
Remark 6 (Role of the Watermark Power σ2x)
A quick inspection of Theorem 1 reveals that the optimal operational mode of
the resulting system depends on σ2s , PA, and PE , and is independent of the wa-
termark power σ2x. Intuitively, this is because of two reasons: First, because of
the nature of the underlying problem, we do not impose any distortion constraint
between X and any other variable in the system. Next, the scaling parameter
α can be used to adjust the contribution of the watermark (cf. (14)) to make it
arbitrarily large or arbitrarily small. Indeed, (23) implies the following: For fixed
σ2s , PA, PE , if a pair of
(
α1, σ
2
x,1
)
is optimal in the sense of Theorem 1, then so
is another pair
(
α2, σ
2
x,2
)
if and only if α1σx,1 = α2σx,2. On the other hand, σ
2
x
directly affects the value of the resulting cost J .
Remark 7 (Asymptotics - Large Signal Case)
It is possible to obtain some asymptotics when σ2s  PE , PA. In that case, the
system will operate at the non-trivial mode at optimality (governed by Theo-
rem 1(a)). Then, (21) can be written as
f
(
σ2u
) ∼ σ6u−σ2u (σ4s + 2PAσ2s)+2PAσ2s = (σ2u − σ2s) (σ4u + σ2uσ2s − 2PA) . (71)
Thus, at optimality, using σ2s  PE , PA, we have
σ2u ∼ σ2s , (72)
β ∼
[
1
2
σ2u + σ
2
s
σ2s
]
∼ 1, (73)
α ∼
√√√√[(σs +√PE)2 − σ2s] [σ2s − (σs −√PE)2]
4σ2sσ
2
x
=
√
PE
σ2x
, (74)
J ∼
[
σ2x − σ4x
α2
σ2s
]
∼
[
σ2x
(
1− PE
σ2s
)]
(75)
where (72) follows from the fact that σ2s is the unique root of (71) in the region
of interest, (73) and (74) follow from using (72) in (22) and (23), respectively,
(75) follows from using (72,74) in (26).
4 Numerical Results
In this section, we numerically illustrate the behavior of the optimal scalar-
Gaussian soft watermarking system as a function of the power of the unmarked
signal, σ2s . The results are presented in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 for a fixed watermark
power σ2x = 10 owing to the discussion in Remark 6. Because of the linear
relationship between κ and σ2z , we do not show σ
2
z vs σ
2
s plots since κ vs σ
2
s plots
are already present.
In Fig. 2, solid, dashed, dash-dotted and dotted lines correspond to the cases
of (PA = 1, PE = 16), (PA = 1, PE = 4), (PA = 4, PE = 1), and (PA = 16, PE = 1),
respectively. Here,
– (a) and (b) show J vs σ2s for the whole range and for σ
2
s small, respectively;
– (c) and (d) show σ2u vs σ
2
s for the whole range and for σ
2
s small, respectively;
– (e), (f), and (g) show α, β and κ as functions of σ2s , respectively.
By Theorem 1, the system always operates in the non-trivial mode for PA ≤
PE (solid and dashed lines), and it operates in the trivial mode for σ
2
s ≤
(√
PA −
√
PE
)2
for PA > PE , i.e., trivial mode for σ
2
s ≤ 1 for (PA = 4, PE = 1)
(dash-dotted line) and σ2s ≤ 9 for (PA = 16, PE = 1) (dotted line), which is
clearly observable in panel (b). Note that, we observe continuity in the behav-
ior of all system elements during the transition between trivial and non-trivial
regions.
In Fig. 3, solid and dashed lines represent true values and large-signal ap-
proximations for PA = PE = 1. As expected, the large-signal approximation
becomes more accurate as σ2s increases.
5 Conclusions
We have introduced the zero-sum game problem of soft watermarking where the
hidden information has a perceptual value and comes from a continuum, unlike
the prior literature on robust data hiding where the focus has been on cases where
the hidden information is an element of a discrete finite set. Accordingly, the
receiver produces a soft estimate of the embedded information in the proposed
setup. As a first step toward this new class of problems, we focus in this paper
on the scalar-Gaussian case with the expected squared estimation error as the
cost function and analyze the resulting zero-sum game between the encoder &
decoder pair and the attacker. Expected distortion constraints are imposed both
on the encoder and the attacker to ensure the perceptual quality. Restricting
the encoder mapping to be linear in the watermark and the unmarked host, we
show that the optimal attack mapping is Gaussian-affine. We derive closed-form
expressions for the system parameters in the sense of minimax optimality. We
further discuss properties of the resulting system in various aspects, including
bounds and asymptotic behavior, and provide numerical results.
Our future work includes an information-theoretic analysis of the problem
considered here, and extensions to settings with privacy and security constraints
(see e.g., [5] for analysis of a similar communication problem with privacy con-
straints).
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